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Abstract
In this article, an important set of general themes will be examined in relation to the 
ongoing problematization of the legitimacy of modern constitutionalism within a 
body of work that largely draws on Carl Schmitt’s political theology. In particular, 
however, the themes discussed in this article will focus on the later, post-war stages 
of his work contained in the brief, but dense volume entitled, Political Theology II. 
This work involves a sustained confrontation with the theologian Erik Peterson and 
the historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg, a confrontation which helps to shed light 
on the broader significance of Schmitt’s work.
Keywords Blumenberg · Constitutionalism · Erik Peterson · Modernity · Political 
theology · Schmitt
Introduction: The Theme of Political Theology in the Debate Over 
the Concept of the Political
In this article, an important set of general themes will be examined in relation to the 
on-going problematization of the legitimacy of modern constitutionalism within a 
body of work that largely draws on Carl Schmitt’s political theology. In particular, 
however, the themes discussed in this article will focus on the later, post-war stages 
of his work contained in the brief, but dense volume entitled, Political Theology II 
(Schmitt 2008). This work involves a sustained confrontation with the theologian 
Erik Peterson and the historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg, a confrontation which 
helps to shed light on the broader significance of Schmitt’s work (Blumenberg 
1983). What exactly is at stake in these debates?
The on-going scholarly engagement with Carl Schmitt’s work has highlighted 
some key themes regarding the nature of judicial discretion in the interpretation of 
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law, the relationship between liberal constitutionalism and constituent power, the 
state of exception and extraordinary constitutional powers, the antagonistic nature of 
political activity as well as the broader theme of political theology. It has also helped 
to consolidate an important distinction between politics and the political which has 
enabled a more nuanced attempt to distinguish more fundamental and determinative 
‘moments’ of political experience from more quotidian and conditioned elements 
that often operate within a limited form of instrumental rationality and bureaucratic 
power.1 A focus on Schmitt’s later work in the light of the linked set of dialogues 
with Blumenberg and Peterson enable this range of themes to be drawn together 
with reference to three critical and interconnected issues: constituent power, antago-
nism and political theology. These issues are further best interpreted as connected 
to an underlying problem: the nature of constitutional legitimacy in the modern age.
The course of the following discussion will seek to set out a particular under-
standing of the problem of legitimacy in contemporary constitutionalism. These 
ideas will then be used to develop a challenge to attempts to resolve the legitimacy 
problem through deploying ideas of political antagonism (one of the most salient 
approaches suggested by leading interpreters of Carl Schmitt’s work). At the same 
time it seeks to do justice to the specific historical setting of the problem of legiti-
macy in the modern epoch, a problem to which the notion of political antagonism 
was also intended to provide a response. This is done through a careful explora-
tion of Schmitt’s nuanced understanding of the topic of political theology and his 
debates with Erik Peterson and Hans Blumenberg. Further examination of these 
points, especially in the light of the work of Erik Peterson and Hans Blumenberg 
help to reveal how an ‘associationalist’ rather than an ‘antagonistic’ reading of the 
dimension of the political can nevertheless be developed which would contribute 
to a renewed understanding of contemporary constitutionalism capable of escaping 
the limits of market rationality and bureaucratic logic.2 Reflection on this difference 
between the antagonistic and associationalist understanding of the fundamental level 
of political agency, the level of the political, is arguably the central question cur-
rently facing constitutional theory and action with regard to problems of legitimacy. 
In brief, the antagonistic reading of the political has its most powerful advocate in 
Carl Schmitt and emphasizes existential enmity as the pivotal concept in political 
1 This is often put in philosophical terms that stem from Heideggerian phenomenology as a distinction 
between the ontological (the political) and the ontic (politics). Its importance in understanding a variety 
of contemporary ‘post-structuralist’ approaches to political theory is set out in Marchart (2007). For such 
post-structuralist thinkers the emphasis is often placed on a foundational ‘moment’ precisely to indicate 
that the foundation cannot itself be objectively determined and adequately conceptualized but is rather 
better interpreted in terms of temporal categories like that of an event. Although, it is risky to read some 
of the latter developments of this line of thinking back into Schmitt’s work, Schmitt’s notion of political 
theology has significant points of commonality. There is, first, the sense that Schmitt grounds politics in 
a certain sort of founding ‘moment’ that has a fluid existential character: a sovereign decision. Second, 
there is Schmitt’s insistence of the ‘autonomy’ of this ‘moment’ precisely as foundational: the sovereign 
decision as its own criterion, the friend-enemy distinction which is not reducible to a more fundamental 
criterion drawn from economics, ethics and so on.
2 For the distinction between ‘associationalist’ and ‘antagonistic’ interpretations of the political see Mar-
chart (2007) and in particular chapter 2.
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life whilst the associationalist reading gives priority to the formation of political 
friendship through dialogue. Both perspectives have been pursued from both left 
and right, and from within different traditions. From a Hegelian-Marxist perspec-
tive, an antagonistic perspective has been developed by Laclau and Mouffe whilst 
an associationalist perspective on the political was developed by Jürgen Habermas 
with his notion of communicative action. Carl Schmitt’s antagonistic political theory 
likewise seems connected to an existential or phenomenological starting point simi-
lar, in this methodological sense, to Arendt’s opposed associationalist emphasis on 
the shared space of public speech or to John Milbank’s and Radical Orthodoxy’s 
emphasis on a Christian ontology and meta-narrative of peace in opposition to a 
pagan or ‘secularist’ ontology of violence (Milbank 2006; Milbank and Pabst 2016).
As stated, the exploration of this tension between antagonistic and associational-
ist readings of the political will be pursued in this article through an examination 
of the problem of political theology as it develops in Schmitt’s engagement with 
Blumenberg and Peterson. The choice of this approach is not simply guided by the 
exegetical interest as to why Schmitt chose the confrontation with Blumenberg and 
Peterson as the terrain of his re-engagement with the theme of political theology 
in the post-war context. It is also guided by the sense that significant progress can 
be made in illuminating the confrontation between antagonistic and associational-
ist conceptions of the political by searching for an underlying theme—the theme of 
political theology—that has the historical and philosophical breadth to set out the 
prior ‘political’ stakes of this debate; in other words, the transcendent features of 
human agency that surpass particular institutional and social forms of life. Without 
this broader sphere of reflection on fundamental questions of ontology, historicity 
and anthropology, there is the danger of collapsing both associationalist and antago-
nistic perspectives into a limited tactical and institutional frame that dilutes their 
critical power. For example, in the work of Jürgen Habermas, there seems to be a 
tendency in his later work to tie the critical potentiality of the early notion of com-
municative action to an inchoate ideal-type liberal democracy and in the work of 
Lefort and Mouffe, as will be discussed, there seems to be too quick an assumption 
that the raw fact of political antagonism can be translated and domesticated into a 
more benign agonic form compatible with present forms of liberal constitutionalism 
and practice.
The idea of taking up the theme of political theology as a fruitful line of inquiry 
into clarifying the distinction between politics and the political, an inquiry that takes 
seriously the problem of transcendence proposed by the latter, has already been pre-
figured in the work of Claude Lefort. For Lefort, an ineliminable historicity and con-
tingency that characterizes and contextualizes human action forms the background 
for thinking about the necessary role of a religious imaginary or of a political theol-
ogy in symbolizing this contingency in the process of instituting social and politi-
cal relations. The complexity of the historical background of human action provides 
a genuinely transcendent framework which resists mastery in terms of any type of 
human action whether instrumental or communicative. For Lefort, modern consti-
tutionalism at its healthiest is characterized by a self-consciousness of the act of 
instituting the social order, an awareness of the underlying historical contingencies 
out of which certain forms of political and social order emerge. Instead of a fixed 
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symbolic representation of this transcendent structure of human agency, this struc-
ture is acknowledged by the symbolic openness of modern political forms. In that 
sense, the structural position of political theology is retained in an open symbolic 
form as a crucial element of a healthy form of modern constitutionalism. The dan-
gers of modern totalitarianism arise where this implicit awareness of a fundamental 
historical contingency is covered over in favour of the self-conscious projection and 
implementation of an imaginary societal unity. This totalitarian potential is held in 
check by a commitment to democratic institutions and human rights instruments that 
provide flexible modalities for collective or individual contestation of rigid schemes 
of social unity.3
Although Lefort’s work usefully synthesizes a number of diverse intellectual cur-
rents into his conception of political theology and the dilemmas of modern consti-
tutionalism to produce a convincing picture of the fundamental characteristics of 
liberal democracy, it is arguable that in so doing, he has moved too quickly to close 
down the range of problems disclosed by the concept of the political and by the 
theme of political theology. For Lefort, liberal-democracy emerges as the only lucid 
and non-totalitarian political response to the ultimate fact of a basic form of histori-
cal contingency. Thus, for Lefort, what is an essentially cognitive move is ultimately 
at stake in the problem of political theology: the function of a discourse on politi-
cal theology is to reveal the essential character of modern constitutional thinking 
to itself. This does not seem to do justice to the specific existential human drama of 
antagonism and association which Schmitt’s original problematic had disclosed in 
relation to this theme. In that sense, although Lefort deploys the concept of politi-
cal theology, he arguably does not succeed in coming to terms with its fundamental 
existential stakes. In order to address both the problem of political theology as well 
as that of antagonism and associationalism, we arguably need to return to Schmitt’s 
original problematic before going on to assess the work of two of his critics who, by 
Schmitt’s admission, challenge his basic position in a fundamental way: Blumenberg 
and Erik Peterson.
Accordingly, the first section explains the importance of the themes of politi-
cal theology and antagonism in articulating the contemporary constitutional sig-
nificance of Carl Schmitt’s work. In brief, Schmitt’s work highlights the sense in 
which an antagonistic understanding of the political is inherently connected with 
an authoritarian or arguably totalitarian form of politics that unites a society around 
a comprehensive collective identity and world-view, a connection expressed in his 
understanding of political theology. His claim is that these connections are inherent 
to the moment of the political: an unavoidable dimension of human existence. The 
second and third sections together move the problem of political theology and its 
relationship to modern constitutionalism to a more historical setting using the work 
of Hans Blumenberg and Karl Löwith and their debate concerning Löwith’s secu-
larization thesis. Accordingly, the second section explains Karl Löwith’s thesis that 
there is a distinctive ‘political theology’ of modern constitutionalism, a theology 
3 For an overall discussion of Lefort see Flynn (2005) and, on the theme of political theology, see 
Lefort’s essay ‘The permanence of the theologico-political?’ in Lefort (1988).
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undermined by its reliance on an illegitimate secularization of the Christian escha-
tological understanding of history. In this respect, Löwith affirms Schmitt’s thesis 
but with a basic scepticism regarding the legitimacy of political theology. The third 
section then proceeds to examine Blumenberg’s alternative conception of modern 
constitutional legitimacy, and the historical awareness that accompanies it. Blumen-
berg’s work is designed to counter the ‘secularization’ thesis, set out by Schmitt and 
Löwith, regarding the continuing role of political theology in modernity and he puts 
forward instead, what he terms, the ideal of self-assertion. The ideal of self-assertion 
is designed to provide an alternative reading of the historical material reviewed by 
Löwith with a view to establishing a move beyond the horizon of political theology. 
The fourth section reviews the subsequent debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg 
over the latter’s concept of self-assertion, a debate which reveals critical limitations 
in the capacity of Blumenberg’s concept to explore the interpersonal and ethical 
dimensions and dynamics of contemporary constitutionalism. The fifth section sets 
out an alternative way of conceptualizing the nature of constitutional authority that 
draws on the lessons of the Schmitt-Blumenberg debate. Through an examination 
of Erik Peterson’s work, it locates the potential for an associationalist alternative 
to Schmitt’s antagonistic reading of the interpersonal dynamics of the political. It 
explores how an authentic theology of the status of political theology opens up a 
specific historical constellation in which interpersonal association can emerge as a 
fundamental option for social and political agency.
Section 1: Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology and the Sphere 
of the Political
Schmitt’s engagement with modern constitutionalism can generally be interpreted 
in a number of distinctive ways. The most influential of these readings tend however 
to attempt to disclose the basic intent and premises of Schmitt’s analyses in his key 
inter-war works. One sort of view, perhaps best represented by William Scheuer-
man, is that Carl Schmitt’s critique of modern liberal constitutionalism is best inter-
preted in the context of the specific set of debates that were taking place in inter-war 
Germany about the stability of the Weimar settlement (Scheuerman 1999). Its on-
going hermeneutic value, at least as far as Scheuerman is concerned, is that it warns 
us of the dangers of exaggerating diagnoses of the indeterminacy and incoherence 
of the law in ways that would undermine the ideal of the rule of law. In this arti-
cle, I would like to pursue a second possible hermeneutic strategy which seeks to 
take seriously the underlying thematic of political theology in Carl Schmitt’s work 
in connection with the notion of the political. It is this dimension of Schmitt’s work 
that arguably locates its fundamental importance in relation to the historical framing 
of the modern problem of constitutional legitimacy as well as conflicting visions of 
associational and antagonistic readings of the political.
The key themes of political theology and of the founding ‘moment’ of the politi-
cal in Schmitt can usefully be introduced in relation to the apparently methodolog-
ical discussions about the nature of a ‘sociology’ of juridical concepts that takes 
place in Political Theology. In this discussion, Schmitt is careful to distinguish what 
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he regards as the proper function of the sociology of juridical concepts. Accord-
ing to him, it cannot be a case of tracing ‘a conceptual result back to a sociological 
carrier’ (Schmitt 2008, p. 44). This is, of course, the most general understanding of 
what the sociology of law amounts to. By ruling this solution out, Schmitt indicates 
that he is searching for a more autonomous ‘political’ grounding for fundamen-
tal legal concepts that resists sociological reduction. Accordingly, for Schmitt, the 
sociology of legal concepts instead ‘aims to discover the basic, radically systematic 
structure [of law] and to compare this conceptual structure with the conceptually 
represented social structure of a certain epoch.’4 As an example, he states that
it is a sociology of the concept of sovereignty when the historical-political sta-
tus of the monarchy of that epoch is shown to correspond to the general state 
of consciousness that was characteristic of western Europeans at that time, and 
when the juristic construction of the historical-political reality can find a con-
cept whose structure is in accord with the structure of metaphysical concepts. 
(Schmitt 2008, pp. 45–46)
A clear summary statement of the relevant connections between juridical concepts 
and encompassing metaphysical-theological concepts is provided in the following:
The presupposition of this kind of sociology of juristic concepts is thus a radi-
cal conceptualization, a consistent thinking that is pushed into metaphysics 
and theology. The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world 
has the same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appro-
priate as a form of its political organization. (Schmitt 2008, p. 46)
Is Schmitt’s emphasis on tracking the theological and metaphysical setting of funda-
mental legal concepts solely a matter of adopting a particular methodology which is 
useful in clarifying, as a matter of historical scholarship, a link between the concep-
tual analysis of fundamental legal concepts and a broader ‘ideological’ context? In 
this sense, it seems difficult to conclude that Schmitt’s work emphasizes the auton-
omy of the political founding moment in so far as it appears to be determined by 
influential ideas within its social setting. Arguably, however, Schmitt wants to show 
that fundamental legal concepts like ‘legitimacy’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘human rights’ 
and so on cannot be reduced to procedural or technical dimensions through which 
they serve certain social goals and purposes but they instead have to be rooted in 
the formation of a broader world-view in a way that has intra-systematic effects on 
law application. Such a broader world-view can in turn be seen as what is substan-
tially at stake in the political ‘moment’ that constitutes a set of inter-related juridical 
concepts and practices. It is then in relation to this underlying political connection 
between a world-view and the juridical concepts that issue from it that it is possible 
4 Schmitt (2008, p. 45). An implication of this conception of the sociology of concepts is that it is not a 
case of referring to historical or sociological context in an explanatory or deterministic sense. Rather, it 
seems to be a way of expanding an understanding of the broader intellectual context of the concept under 
examination. As he puts it, ‘…this sociology of concepts is concerned with establishing proof of two 
spiritual but at the same time substantial identities.’
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to situate some of the contributions Schmitt made to topics of perennial and con-
temporary controversy such as those of the state of exception and of legal interpre-
tation. For example, in respect of the topic of legal interpretation, Schmitt insists 
that: ‘Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can 
be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a 
homogenous medium’ (Schmitt 2008, p. 13). Such a ‘homogenous medium’ or ‘nor-
mal, everyday frame of life’ is arguably invoked by Schmitt with reference to the 
metaphysical view that subtends the juridical concepts of the system.
Schmitt’s reflections on the sociology of juridical concepts indicate an important 
connection between the moment of the political and the broader metaphysical world-
views characteristic of a certain society. Such considerations already bring theology 
(in a broad sense) and the political into some kind of relation. The entire picture on 
Schmitt’s concept of political theology needs to be completed by considering the 
theme of sovereign decision and the theme of political antagonism. In terms of his 
polemic with liberal constitutionalism, the basic structure of legal concepts and of 
the way they are interpreted further enables Schmitt to develop an emphasis on the 
concept of ‘sovereignty’ and the related concept of the ‘state of exception’ as the on-
going and omnipresent moments in the legal system that relates the application of 
law to the underlying metaphysical world-view. Accordingly, Schmitt states, 
The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the 
monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sov-
ereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to 
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. (Schmitt 2008, p. 19)
The systematic nature of the ‘state of exception’ as a consequence of the need 
for judgment in relating the legal order as a whole in its application to the particular 
case is shown in the following quotation:
Every concrete juristic decision contains a moment of indifference from the 
perspective of content, because the juristic deduction is not traceable in the 
last detail to its premises and because the circumstance that requires a decision 
remains an independently determining moment. (Schmitt 2008, p. 30)
The polemic with liberalism is further sharpened by the discussion in The Concept 
of the Political which seeks to highlight a connection between the sovereign deci-
sion governing the continuity of the ‘normal situation’ and the existential stakes of 
the distinction between the ‘political friendship’ possible within the ‘normal situ-
ation’ and enmity with the actual and potential human existential possibilities that 
challenge this situation (Schmitt 1996). This intuition concerning the basic link-
age between political theology and the so-called friend-enemy distinction provides 
the basis for Schmitt’s distinctively ‘antagonistic’ reading of the political. Over-
all, Schmitt’s polemic with liberalism consists of two stages: most fundamentally, 
a critique of an overly abstract idea of the rule of law that reduces law to a mere 
instrument of social co-ordination and second, a critique of its emphasis on a decep-
tively dialogic mode of politics as an evasion of the moment of sovereign decision 
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in antagonism, a decision which, for Schmitt, is the only way law will recover its 
existential dignity.
In summary, what emerges from Schmitt’s sociology of juridical concepts, the 
idea of sovereignty and the notion of political antagonism is the notion of sover-
eignty as a form of radical decisional capacity related to its grasp of the overall 
structure of social and political order in terms of underlying world-view and in terms 
of its capacity to shape relations of friendship and enmity. In this way, the politi-
cal/politics distinction is mapped onto a distinctive form of fundamental political 
theology. Schmitt’s particular arrangement of these ideas has been re-appropriated 
within modern constitutional theories seeking to draw on the distinction between 
‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Schmitt’s intention, with his emphasis on the concept of 
the political, seems to be to reinforce a conservative or authoritarian politics, where 
the function of the sovereign grasp of the moment of the ‘political’ is intended to 
ensure the continuity of a given social and political order—shaped by a particular 
world-view—within the contingent realm of political action. However, it is easy to 
see how the idea of an antagonistic sovereign decision could also invigorate a poli-
tics seeking to inaugurate more radical forms of social transformation.
Accordingly, Carl Schmitt’s work helps to discover a broader context and agenda 
for reflection regarding the problems of contemporary constitutionalism and this is 
connected with a wider turn to consider the significance of the distinction between 
‘politics’ and the ‘political’, the role of political theology and the notion of antago-
nism in relation to fundamental problems of political legitimacy.
Section 2: The Secularization Thesis
In the following sections, I would like to situate this reflection on the fundamental 
character of modern constitutionalism and in particular the concepts of the political 
and of political theology within a more historical setting. This setting can then be 
used to explore, in the concrete setting of modernity, the foundational problematic 
of Schmitt’s work in general; namely, his interest in basic metaphysical world-views 
and their relationship to fundamental juridical concepts of sovereignty and legiti-
macy. In brief, this involves a direct engagement with the topic of political theology, 
and its relation to the systematic problem of legitimacy in modernity. In order to 
delimit the discussion of Schmitt’s work in the following sections, I will accordingly 
seek to focus the treatment of his work through a distinctive foundational problem; 
namely, that of the problem of legitimacy in modernity or, as Blumenberg has for-
mulated it, the problem of the legitimacy of the modern age. Blumenberg’s work 
is particularly useful in focusing this problem because he establishes a theoretical 
framework that allows systematic rather than partial and discrete problems of social 
and political order to be investigated by means of an historical narrative that unlocks 
the fundamental questions of legitimacy to which precisely these systematic forms 
of social and political life are the response. Blumenberg’s work engaged directly 
with the underlying problematic of Schmitt’s earlier work; namely, the role of politi-
cal theology in the context of the modern epoch and Schmitt’s return to examine this 
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theme in critical dialogue with Blumenberg in Political Theology II indicates the 
acuity of the challenge from Schmitt’s standpoint.
Blumenberg’s work in this regard is framed by a critical reaction to a broader 
thesis in the field of the history of ideas relating to the concept of legitimacy in the 
modern era; namely, the secularization thesis developed by Karl Löwith in his book 
Meaning in History (1949). This thesis is taken up in his own way by Schmitt in 
arguing for the perennial function of political theology even in the context of mod-
ern constitutionalism. Löwith, in contrast to Schmitt, offers a fairly specific account 
of the form of political theology associated with modernity; namely, one connected 
to historical development and its overarching meaning and direction. The subject of 
Meaning in History is the ‘philosophy of history’ which Löwith defines as ‘a sys-
tematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by which 
historical events and successions are unified and directed toward an ultimate mean-
ing’ (Löwith 1949, p. 1). From the outset, then, we can see the potential relationship 
that exists between the idea of the philosophy of history, and the sort of political 
formation of a world-view that fits the Schmittian concept of political theology. In 
this section, Löwith’s basic position will be set out and discussed.
The point that Löwith ultimately wants to make in his discussion of this subject, 
which is traced back through a number of authors such as, at one end of the histori-
cal spectrum, the nineteenth-century historian Burckhardt and, at the other, the fifth-
century Christian writer, Orosius, is that philosophy of history draws its basic con-
ceptual strategies from the theology of history. As Löwith puts it, ‘…philosophy of 
history is…entirely dependent on theology of history, in particular on the theologi-
cal concept of history as a history of fulfilment and salvation’ (Löwith 1949, p. 1) 
Summing up his thesis he states, ‘philosophy of history originates with the Hebrew 
and Christian faith in a fulfilment and it ends with the secularization of its eschato-
logical pattern’ (Löwith 1949, p. 2) In this way, Löwith develops the idea that the 
fundamental world–view of modernity is based on a ‘secularization’ of categories of 
understanding drawn from a theology of history grounded in the biblical heritage of 
Judaism and Christianity.
This theme of ‘secularization’ is, of course, also invoked by Schmitt in his discus-
sion of the concept of sovereignty in Political Theology. To quote the entire sen-
tence in which he makes perhaps his most well known claim:
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theo-
logical concepts not only because of their historical development – in which 
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for 
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also 
because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for 
a sociological consideration of these concepts. (Schmitt 2008, p. 36)
Recalling the parallel with Schmitt’s idea of secularization is useful in connection 
with this discussion because it emphasizes the role played by concepts in contem-
porary politics that perform the same function as theological concepts in articulat-
ing an overarching comprehensive world-view which in turn provides the basis for 
the operation of an interlinked set of social and political practices. In other words, 
such concepts are used to articulate the basis for the ‘systematic structures’ invoked 
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by Carl Schmitt in this quotation from Political Theology. Beyond Löwith and 
Schmitt’s initial work on this theme of secularization, it is also worth noting the way 
in which it has been taken up by writers like John Milbank. Writing in a more post-
modern context, Milbank makes the important point that the ‘secularization’ thesis 
helps to develop a genealogy of the contingent and debatable theological origins 
of certain forms of modern sociological and constitutional thinking that understand 
modern principles of social understanding, such as those of secularism, liberalism 
and progress, in an axiomatic or ‘essentialist’ manner (Milbank 2006).
Section 3: Blumenberg’s Challenge to the Secularization Thesis
In this section, we will set out how Blumenberg challenges Löwith’s secularization 
thesis (and by extension Schmitt’s) with regard to the legitimacy and applicability 
of, what we can term, the concept of political theology of the modern epoch. At its 
core, Blumenberg’s response to Löwith can be construed as involving a fundamental 
re-interpretation of the idea of philosophy of history and a reassessment of what is 
in fact at stake in it. For Löwith, the modern idea of a philosophy of history is neces-
sarily set up as an (illegitimate) transposition of the Christian theological concept 
of the history of salvation (which can admittedly take forms as different as the his-
torical consciousness of Marx, Comte or Burckhardt). This transposition necessar-
ily has political implications in that it involves immanent eschatological ideas and 
frameworks that establish patterns for social transformation. The alternative to the 
transposition of a theological concept of history is, for Löwith, another sort of the-
ology or cosmology that situates historical events within a different form of under-
standing of humanity and its relation to an ultimate ontology of being and destiny: 
in his case, the Greco-Roman concept of the cyclical nature of fortuna. For Blumen-
berg, the basic setting within which the philosophy of history operates is narrower 
than Löwith’s cosmological setting. The proper role of a philosophy of history is 
to set out the historical context of the problems that define a specifically secular 
set of questions regarding the ‘reliability’ of the basic presuppositions underpinning 
contingent forms of public order. Thus, the problem of regime legitimacy is con-
fronted at the level of effective historicity rather than that of metaphysics. In other 
words, through a careful analysis of its historical nexus, Blumenberg’s ambitious 
work seeks to prise the problem of legitimacy in modern societies from the grip of 
an overarching political theology in which the framework of the ‘political’ is estab-
lished in and through a sovereign decision and with a definite metaphysical view at 
stake.
In a sense, Löwith might be said to anticipate the possibility of taking this more 
modest approach to resolving the legitimacy of modernity’s conception of itself 
through the philosophy of history. After mentioning Burckhardt’s more sceptical 
conception of historical existence, the way he had ‘dismissed the theological, philo-
sophical and socialistic interpretations of history’ and ultimately his reduction of 
history to ‘mere continuity, without beginning, progress, or end’, Löwith however 
goes on to criticize this as an overemphasis on ‘mere continuity’ and as a ‘poor 
reminder’ of a ‘fuller notion of meaning’ (Löwith 1949, p. 192). He then goes on to 
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diagnose this ‘overemphasis’ on historical continuity as ‘a product of our alienation 
from the natural theology of antiquity and from the supernatural theology of Chris-
tianity’ (Löwith 1949, p. 192). However, this type of reply appears to underestimate 
the key challenge of Blumenberg’s work which is precisely to propose a way of dis-
tancing the historical understanding of the legitimacy of particular forms of social 
order from the cosmological, eschatological or quasi-eschatological presuppositions 
that, in Löwith’s mind, necessarily accompany it.
If this attempt at re-assessing the type of historical self-understanding of moder-
nity is at the methodological core of Blumenberg’s approach, what consequences 
does he draw from it and how does it relate to our central theme here, the nature 
of constitutional legitimacy in modernity? Blumenberg’s primary concern in The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age is to defend a renewed understanding of the progres-
sive character of history in modernity and crucially of a relatively tentative form of 
legitimacy that can distance itself from the legacy of political theology. To provide 
a brief summary of these points, it is worth beginning with the problem of legiti-
macy which is the more complex of these two points. For Blumenberg, the prob-
lem of legitimacy posed in the modern age emerged out of a specific tension in the 
world-view of medieval Christendom that had prevailed following the collapse of 
pagan Rome and survived even the collapse of Roman secular power. In line with 
other historians of ideas, like Erik Voegelin (see Voegelin 2000), he highlighted 
the importance of a theological controversy between orthodox Christianity (whose 
principal advocate and representative figure was St. Augustine) and Gnosticism. For 
now, the key point that was at stake in this debate, which took place in different 
forms, might be described, to use a slightly different term than Blumenberg here, as 
the problem of ontological security. How can trust and confidence be sustained in a 
common world despite manifest flaws: wars, dissensions and so forth? The debate 
concluded, in Blumenberg’s view, with an affirmation of an orthodox doctrine of 
divine omnipotence and providence which did not fully resolve all the questions 
posed by the Gnostic challenge. This resulted in a crisis of confidence in the role 
played by Christianity in sustaining public culture and the search for alternatives, 
a crisis of confidence and an ensuing search which, for Blumenberg legitimated, in 
historical terms, the ‘modern’ option eventually settled on.
The modern alternative to the world-view of medieval Christendom was a vision 
of a comprehensive view of historical progress which Blumenberg terms the ‘ideal 
of self-assertion’. One of the key points about ‘self-assertion’ is not only that it 
responds to the specific historical challenges of legitimacy but also that, according 
to Blumenberg, it was not a ‘secularization’ of a previous theological concept. For 
Blumenberg, progress as an ideal of self-assertion was a generalization of a notion 
of progress which was generated by specific sorts of procedures and advances made 
initially in limited technical and scientific fields. At the same time, the generaliza-
tion of this idea enabled a wider culture to articulate an historical self-understanding 
which allowed it to recover a sense of reliability and trust in its world and environ-
ment based on a more modest sense of progress and self-assertion.
In addition to setting out the ideal of self-assertion, a significant part of Blumen-
berg’s work is also devoted to diagnosing and explaining the important sociologi-
cal and ideological idea of ‘re-occupation’. This idea is used to account in part for 
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the fact that the notion of legitimacy in modernity is a contested terrain. According 
to him, certain ideas that belong to traditional world-views (like for example that 
of the significance of history as a whole) do not entirely disappear. Rather, certain 
of their ‘functions’ are transposed into symbolic forms consistent with a modern 
world-view such as, for example, the ideology of secular progress. Generally, it is 
important to note that, whilst Blumenberg uses the idea of re-occupation to account 
for these symbolic transpositions, he is generally critical of the procedure itself. It is 
this idea of ‘re-occupied’ functions that is used to develop a focused critique of Carl 
Schmitt’s work and, in particular, his insistence on the perennial nature of political 
theology.
The debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg is complex and resulted in a num-
ber of important revisions to The Legitimacy of the Modern Age and in particular to 
Part I, chapter 8. We will examine certain strands of this debate at a later stage in 
the article however the key point of Blumenberg’s critique of Schmitt might be said 
to be that he disputes the connection Schmitt seeks to forge between legitimacy and 
the sovereign decision to maintain a comprehensive ‘normal situation’ in the face of 
possible enmity. Blumenberg insists that such a notion of legitimacy is inappropri-
ate in the context of the modern principle of self-assertion which demands a more 
pragmatic approach to the development of collective institutions rather than one that 
appeals to their capacity to enact and sustain an absolute form of commitment to an 
overarching world-view:
When it is no longer possible to believe that the decision between good and 
evil is going to occur in history and is immediately impending, and that every 
political act participates in this crisis, the suggestiveness of the ‘state of emer-
gency’ as the normal political state disappears. (Blumenberg 1983, p. 91)
At the same time, he recognizes that Schmitt’s notion of legitimacy does draw on 
a certain sort of social phenomenon; namely, the residual and widespread need for 
a collective vehicle of existential commitment. The ongoing appeal to an absolute 
existential political commitment as it exists in modernity, according to Blumenberg, 
is not tied to an ‘external’ theological or metaphysical point of reference but is more 
flexible in identifying symbols of identity, friendship and enmity.5 That this type of 
phenomenon cannot be described as a ‘secular’ form of ‘political theology’ seems to 
follow precisely from the relative flexibility of the object of this sort of commitment. 
It both belongs to modern politics but in Blumenberg’s view sits awkwardly with its 
central principle of legitimacy, the largely pragmatic ideal of self-assertion.
In sum, we can say that Blumenberg takes the view that the Schmittian concept 
of legitimacy captures a genuine sociological reality: an anachronistic need for com-
mitments to social and political forms to be understood in terms that are absolute 
5 He gives as an example of shifting ‘absolute’ forms of identification, the move from politicized confes-
sional identities to national identities: ‘…what happened was that the intolerability of the factionalization 
of absolute positions within the state was counteracted by the transfer of the category of the uncondi-
tional friend/enemy relation to the conflicts between the national states that were in the process of inte-
grating themselves’ (Blumenberg 1983. p. 90).
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in an existential sense. This need, however, has to be understood as a problematic 
and distorted ‘re-occupation’ of a requirement of absolute commitment to symbols 
of legitimacy which is no longer appropriate. If Blumenberg is right, we can say 
that the underlying problematic of Schmitt’s work, the problem of political theology, 
can be seen as of relative importance and as ultimately unnecessary in understand-
ing the sources of legitimacy in modern legal systems. Although we might say that 
the danger of ‘re-occupations’ are always present and that careful consideration of 
Schmitt’s work helps to clarify this point, Blumenberg’s work ultimately supports 
a radical scepticism towards the systematic introduction of Schmittian themes into 
the understanding of contemporary constitutionalism. A key Schmittian theme that 
Blumenberg’s work does not necessarily unpick is the political/politics distinction. 
Although the idea does not appear to be particularly important to him, it might still 
retain a methodological utility where the ‘moment’ of the political is understood as 
referring to a broader process of historical development. At the end of this examina-
tion, however, a difficult question remains for Blumenberg: does the ideal of self-
affirmation present an adequate understanding of the problem of legitimacy in mod-
ern constitutionalism?
Section 4: Blumenberg and Ideal of Self‑Assertion: Stat pro Ratione 
Libertas, et Novitas per Libertate
As we have seen, Blumenberg’s work on the historical setting of the development of 
the ‘self-assertive’ ethos of modernity arguably helps to clarify how a strong con-
cept of sovereign decision performs certain sorts of functions that are determined by 
a symbolic process of legitimation that in other, more critical, respects has been set 
aside. Accordingly, Blumenberg’s work might most straightforwardly be interpreted 
as preparing the way for a more modest understanding of constitutionalism in terms 
that would owe more to a classical liberal form of pre-political right like that of John 
Locke or, perhaps, the more social liberal contractualism of John Rawls. In place 
of ideas like that of collective self-determination and forms of secularized political 
theology, it would be possible to conceptualize something like a ‘global’ setting for 
what Schmitt characterizes in his critical discussion of Blumenberg in Political The-
ology II as a more technical and neutral mode of constitutionalism, which would be 
aimed at securing scientific neutrality, technical and industrial freedom of produc-
tion and guaranteed conditions for ‘free human utilization’ on the basis of widely 
agreed universal parameters. At the same time, Schmitt’s pointed rejoinder to the 
self-assertive ethos put forward by Blumenberg must be weighed carefully. Schmitt 
poses the following question to Blumenberg: ‘Which of these three freedoms is 
intrinsically the most intense and aggressive: scientific neutrality, the technical and 
industrial freedom of production or the arbitrary nature of free human utilization?’ 
(Schmitt 2008, p. 130).
In framing the question, Schmitt anticipates the probable reply that a negative 
evaluation of the ‘aggressive’ potential implied in the ideal of free human realiza-
tion would in turn imply that only an objective scheme of values inconsistent with 
the ideal of self-assertion can offer any reassurance. As he puts it, ‘Should this 
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question be ruled out of court on academic grounds, because the word “aggressive” 
has become value-free, then the situation would be clear: stat pro ratione Libertas, 
et Novitas per Libertate [Freedom replaces Reason, and Novelty replaces Freedom]’ 
(Schmitt 2008, p. 130). The very idea of a scheme of values, acting as a secure onto-
logical and evaluative precondition of agency has apparently been set aside at the 
outset in the diagnosis of an historical shift underpinning the birth of the idea of 
‘self-assertion’ and its accompanying reconfiguration of standards of political legiti-
macy. Schmitt’s somewhat enigmatic answer to this might be interpreted as follows: 
that there is nothing in the idea of self-assertion that can ground any sort of settled 
ethic of mutual respect capable of moderating the sort of practical efforts that might 
be made to reconfigure each possible social and political form of self-assertion. In 
other words, modern human agency is paradoxically constrained to comply with an 
overriding commitment to applying novel possibilities and social forms, combined 
with the ‘creative destruction’ that this implies, with no particular ground for an 
ethical warranty for the concrete actions taken.
How is it possible for Blumenberg to answer this problem? In one sense, a straight-
forward response might simply be to insist on a necessary sort of mutuality and reci-
procity inherent in the general affirmation and guarantee of a right to ‘free human 
utilization’ of scientific advances and the potentialities of technology and production 
processes. However, this solution is not as straightforward as it might first appear. At a 
deeper level, we arguably need to return to the terms in which Blumenberg framed the 
leading metaphysical-political problem of modernity in order to clarify this idea and to 
explore the tensions that might exist here with the overarching concept of self-assertion.
For Blumenberg, the roots and motives for the modern ideal of self-assertion 
emerge from a particular constellation of ideas characteristic of medieval Christen-
dom. The debate between Gnosticism and orthodox Christianity which he sees as 
framing medieval Christendom was, in a prima facie sense, a problem concerning 
‘trust’ in the created world which largely posed problems concerning the relation-
ship between creation and questions of personal salvation. Blumenberg sees this 
debate as one concerning personally indexed soteriology and this is probably a rela-
tively accurate way of understanding this controversy. At another level however, and 
in terms of the connection between metaphysics and politics, it might be said that 
another question which was at stake in this debate, or at least an important aspect of 
its overall dynamic and importance, was the reliability of the ‘world’ understood in 
a more social and political sense.
As Blumenberg makes clear, the soteriological problem, posed by Gnosticism, of 
the relationship between creation, providence and salvation was ultimately supplied 
with a systematic doctrinal resolution through the Augustinian hermeneutic of free 
will, original sin, grace, predestination and election. For Blumenberg, however, this 
‘first overcoming’ of Gnosticism was unsuccessful and it required a ‘second over-
coming’ in the modern ideal of self-assertion. Accordingly, Blumenberg sets out the 
following rather stark verdict on Augustinianism:
The Gnostic dualism had been eliminated as far as the metaphysical world 
principle was concerned, but it lived on in the bosom of mankind and its his-
tory as the absolute separation of the elect from the rejected. This crudity, 
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devised for the justification of God, had its unspoken irony in the fact that the 
absolute principle’s responsibility for cosmic corruption – the elimination of 
which had been the point of the whole exercise – was after all reintroduced 
indirectly through the idea of predestination. (Blumenberg 1983, p. 155)
Arguably, however, part of what took place in the development of the post-medieval 
engagement in this problem was a differentiation of the soteriological dimension of the 
‘Gnostic’ problematic from the ethical–political dimension of trust and confidence in 
social and political institutions. This was eventually expressed in a distinction between 
the interrelated spheres of ‘grace’ (soteriology) and ‘nature’ (temporal order) devel-
oped in medieval scholasticism.6 Leaving aside his rather one-sided interpretation 
of the doctrine of predestination, Blumenberg’s sense that a ‘second-overcoming’ of 
Gnosticism was indeed required is arguably based on the premise that Augustianism 
failed to offer a coherent basis for a ‘public metaphysics’ capable not only of resolving 
problems internal to Christian theology and proclamation, but simultaneously provid-
ing a wider basis for civic co-operation in quotidian and secular affairs. It is Blumen-
berg’s expectation that Augustinianism was bound to supply a direct answer to this 
second type of issue grounded in its soteriology that leads him to diagnose an insuf-
ficiency and to search for a ‘second-overcoming’ of Gnosticism in the ideal of self-
assertion. As such, there seems to be an arbitrary basis for Blumenberg’s insistence on 
the necessity for the ideal of self-assertion as a ‘second-overcoming’ of Gnosticism, 
something which supports Schmitt’s critique as to its essentially ‘aggressive’ stance.
A last step would be to question the appropriateness of the ideal of self-assertion 
for modern constitutionalism as Blumenberg interprets it. Whilst, as we have seen, 
Blumenberg goes some way to detaching social and political legitimacy from a sec-
ularized eschatology, the ideal of self-assertion arguably still attempts, to use his 
own terminology, to ‘re-occupy’ a position or function served by the idea of trust or 
confidence in a cosmic order or mythical framework, an order connected with a par-
ticular social and political regime. It arguably does this through setting out the ques-
tion of ‘trust’ in ontological or mythical terms; that is, as a prior ‘setting’ for politics 
requiring ultimate allegiance. For Blumenberg, political theologies secured stability 
through a mutual confidence in the ontological continuity of society’s ‘basic struc-
ture’ with a certain order of being or with a mythical past. Whilst, for Blumenberg, 
modernity sets such an order of being or mythical past aside in order to engage in a 
project of self-assertion, it is arguable that this ideal of self-assertion is still deter-
mined by what might be described as an ultimate ontological setting. In that sense, 
self-assertion might also be seen as performing a ‘re-occupied’ function. One way 
of putting this is that the ‘teleological’ framework once supplied by the order of 
the cosmos or of a primordial myth is transcribed to the plastic sensibility of self-
assertion: an unqualified aesthetic confidence in the variety of future possibilities 
it may engender.7 Trust, therefore is still implicitly understood in mythical or, in 
6 For a useful introductory discussion of this complex distinction see Swafford (2014).
7 Blumenberg describes the ethic of self-assertion as ‘an existential program, according to which man 
posits his existence in a historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the real-
ity surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are open to him’ (Blumenberg 
1983, p. 133).
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a modern sense, aesthetic terms as an ultimate object of affective allegiance, even 
where Blumenberg, as against Nietzsche, draws attention to its unmasterable histori-
cal constraints. An alternative would be to think about the proper characteristics of a 
secular civil order in terms of the dynamics of an inter-personal sensibility of trust 
that does not require a necessary reference to a broader legitimating myth: a quasi-
ontological setting of ultimate political allegiance. In this sense, the ideal of self-
assertion and its ‘aesthetization’ of the principle of ontological trust would no longer 
form an appropriate basis for the legitimacy of a secular political regime that can set 
aside legitimation on the basis of a political theology.
Section 5: The Problem of Political Theology: From Antagonism 
to Association
In this section, I would like to defend an idea of contemporary constitutionalism that 
is grounded in civic association rather than forms of contestation connected to existen-
tial identification with a polemically staked out world-view (a political theology). This 
is done by focusing on a problem left over from the critique of Blumenberg’s thesis 
concerning the centrality of the ideal of self-assertion to the legitimacy of the cen-
tral institutions of modern societies. This problem concerns the nature of the mutually 
sustained interpersonal forms of reliability or trust that underpin the stability of social 
and political institutions. Such an interpersonal sense of trust can then form the found-
ing basis of quotidian politics, challenging Carl Schmitt’s alignment of the founding 
moment of the political and political trust with the antagonistic distinction between 
friend and enemy, a distinction which has as its object a politically secured world-
view. As we have seen, Carl Schmitt in Political Theology II presents an incisive cri-
tique of Blumenberg’s ideal of self-assertion for its unqualified aesthetic adherence 
to modern processes of social transformation and the associated forms of social and 
political antagonism this implies. The reservations expressed by Schmitt are, as have 
been discussed, not adequately addressed due to the implicitly mythical dimension to 
the ideal of self-assertion itself. As we have suggested, the mythical frame associated 
with the value of self-assertion is perhaps an attempt to ‘re-occupy’ some of the func-
tions performed by the ‘political theologies’ of pre-modernity (as well as the modern 
ideal of secular progress) in legitimating social institutions.
In the light of this, the key question is: what conclusions should we draw from 
Schmitt’s critique of Blumenberg in Political Theology II? If we accept the critique, 
arguably two sorts of strategies present themselves. On the one hand, we might 
choose to affirm Schmitt’s exposure of the antagonistic underpinnings of the modern 
ideal of self-assertion in an effort to moderate any of their unmediated implications. 
This is one way of looking at the Schmittian-influenced idea of agonic constitution-
alism. On the other, we might look for ways in which ‘reliability’ and ‘trust’ in civic 
institutions might be sustained without reference to the antagonistic processes asso-
ciated with the Schmittian concept of the political. This second strategy is the one 
that will be explored in this section.
Defending this second understanding of contemporary constitutionalism entails 
an engagement with the first ‘agonic’ strategy of interpreting the outcome of the 
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Schmitt-Blumenberg debate. According to this view, both Schmitt and Blumenberg’s 
work attest to the on-going significance of an essential antagonistic dimension in 
politics. In addition, Blumenberg’s work, in the light of Schmitt’s critique, suggests 
that the antagonistic dimension of politics is essential even for a self-designated 
democratic and progressive politics based on the modern idea of self-assertion. On 
the agonistic view of liberal-democracy, the self-assertive ethos of modernity does 
indeed generate specific social practices and political institutions which necessar-
ily involve the unilateral imposition of specific forms of social organization in ways 
that are problematically arbitrary in terms of prior normative principle. However, it 
would see in the very continuity of the ‘novelty’ and drive to social transformation 
implicit in the overarching precedence of the ethic of self-assertion, a jurisprudential 
source of the various forms of rights, institutions, procedures and so forth that can 
be associated with liberal principles. This allows what would otherwise amount to a 
predictable exercise in social coercion to be contested and enlivened by the disrup-
tion of bureaucratic routine and the multiple shifts in demand characteristic of mar-
ket societies. The ideal associated with this particular approach to re-thinking liberal 
constitutionalism through the work of Carl Schmitt is termed ‘agonic democracy’ 
and is associated in particular with the work of Chantal Mouffe.
For Mouffe, liberal-democracy involves a form of political self-understanding 
that holds two distinct moments in tension. These two moments are: first, ‘democ-
racy’ as the point where civic engagement generates, through the exclusion of alter-
natives, particular sorts of borders and internal boundaries marking a ‘shared’ form 
of social and political life between equal citizens; and second, ‘liberalism’ as the 
rights and procedures that permit the problematization of what has thus been put in 
common. A useful summary of all this is contained in the following statement which 
characterizes the twofold ‘logic’ sustaining the specificity of liberal democracy:
The democratic logic of constituting the people, and inscribing rights and 
equality into practices, is necessary to subvert the tendency towards abstract 
universalism inherent in liberal discourse. But the articulation with the liberal 
logic allows us constantly to challenge – through reference to ‘humanity’ and 
the polemical use of ‘human rights’ – the forms of exclusion that are neces-
sarily inscribed in the political practice of installing those rights and defining 
which is going to rule. (Mouffe 1999, pp. 43–44)
It is useful to see agonic democracy as an attempt to bring together, in a more pro-
ductive sense, the ideal of self-affirmation stemming from Blumenberg’s work and 
Schmitt’s emphasis on the necessarily antagonistic dimension of identity formation 
in politics. However, the synthesis it can be interpreted as effecting is at the cost of 
excluding important dimensions of the work of these thinkers. In Blumenberg’s case 
it fails to do justice to the inherited historical problematic of how trust in common 
political and social institutions is sustained. In addition, Schmitt’s work clearly does 
not straightforwardly affirm the priority of a general form of ‘antagonism’ in social 
and political relations. The political in the strict sense only refers to enmity in view 
of a specific object of metaphysical or theological political allegiance. Antagonism 
is always related to the theme of political theology. As an object of allegiance, an 
ethic of the political, in Schmitt’s sense, would see antagonism as the route to a 
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precarious social stability centred on a shared, or at least an existentially and collec-
tively compelling world-view, rather than further contestation.
A liberal form of agonistic democracy can perhaps feel comfortable with leaving 
this difference in spirit and intent stand. However, one of the central concerns of 
agonistic democrats was to offer an antidote to what they see as excessively depoliti-
cized forms of global governance: ‘Only by coming to terms with the double move-
ment of inclusion and exclusion that democratic politics entails can we deal with the 
challenge with which the process of globalization confronts us today’ (Blumenberg 
1983, p. 52). It seems that Schmitt’s most convincing challenge to global govern-
ance relates to the danger of the predominance of technical and systematic forms 
of co-ordination operating, due to precisely their instrumental character, within a 
‘global’ epistemic sphere. At the core of this challenge is a stress on the importance 
of interpersonal trust in the form of political friendship as one of the key dimensions 
of the lifeworld sustained by political action.8 Over and above its ultimate ‘antago-
nistic’ stakes, Schmitt’s work challenges the view that a substantial ethic of politi-
cal friendship can be sustained given predominant forms of instrumental rational-
ity. Schmitt’s own critique of technocratic and de-politicized forms of governance 
implies that their deficits lie not only in removing issues of political contestation 
from the agenda but also in setting aside issues of solidarity and the common good. 
This leaves bureaucracy and market rationality as the only practical means of social 
co-ordination.
A further question now arises: whether the political solidarity, required to move 
beyond antagonism and market co-ordination, is to be understood in contingent 
terms as a relatively stable and coherent order in the context of the continuity of 
secular history or whether it should be seen as directly connected to a deeper over-
arching world-view or underlying quasi-ontological setting? Another way of posing 
this question is: can political allegiances claim to be binding existentially in a strong 
ultimate or in a weaker more relative sense? It is here that the work of Erik Peterson 
and his critique of Carl Schmitt is important in challenging the appropriateness of 
the category of political theology for secular forms of political authority (Peterson 
2011).
The central text in which Peterson challenges the work of Carl Schmitt in devel-
oping the idea of political theology in connection with political legitimacy and 
political friendship is entitled ‘Monotheism as a Political Problem’. Its direct import 
for these questions, certainly in so far as they carry a contemporary resonance, is 
not immediately apparent. However, in the same way as Blumenberg, the sorts of 
questions raised by Schmitt regarding the conceptual relationship between juridi-
cal concepts and metaphysical-theological concepts are approached, by Peterson, 
not in polemic-existential terms but in terms of effective history. As with Blumen-
berg, the attempt to frame these issues in terms of effective history involves a form 
of historical understanding connected to evaluating substantive questions regarding 
legitimacy. As discussed in section one, the problems of legitimacy and existential 
8 Colliot-Thélène (1999) usefully explores Carl Schmitt’s work as an attempt to challenge Max Weber’s 
reduction of law (and constitutionalism) to a matter of instrumental technique.
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trust, the problems concerning the founding moment of the political, are seen by 
Schmitt as resolved within the crucible of a polemical sovereign decision in the pre-
sent ‘moment’, through which friend and enemy are seen and distinguished. Blu-
menberg and Peterson see the ‘moment’ of the political less as coming to resolution 
at an instant of political decision than as worked out through a compelling long-term 
narrative understanding of a larger historical situation. Hence the sense in which 
Schmitt saw the need to return to a dialogic confrontation with these two thinkers in 
Political Theology II in order to vindicate the fundamental necessity of political the-
ology and to defend it against these attempts to relativize its historical importance.
Like Blumenberg, Peterson sees the critical questions surrounding the relation-
ship between political theology and legitimacy as being shaped, in an historically 
decisive manner, in the period of the early church and in the context of the polemic 
between the early church fathers and pagan writers. To summarize a more detailed 
argument, Peterson notes how the problematization of political theology arose out of 
polemical issues regarding the (negative) effect of Christianity on the stability of the 
Roman Empire. The Christian defence to this was to argue that the de-legitimation 
of various national forms of civic religion or political theology, which Christianity 
set in motion, strengthened the more universal form of the Roman Empire. At the 
same time, the more universal political form could be supported by certain sorts of 
arguments from providence or by a broader consideration of the historical situation. 
However, Peterson suggests that the Christian arguments that supported the claims 
of the Roman Empire were, crucially, only advanced in a historically relative rather 
than in an absolute sense so that they did not amount to a replacement political the-
ology. In addition and in summary of his detailed argument on the point, Peterson 
claims that further examination of the question by Christian theologians revealed 
that there were structural obstacles within Christianity itself to developing a politi-
cal theology capable of commanding ultimate allegiance to the imperial polity. The 
first of these was drawn from the topic of salvation history and is relatively well 
known as the classic Augustinian argument concerning the relative and non-ultimate 
authority of secular institutions in the light of the coming Parousia: the so-called 
Two Kingdoms Theology.9 The second point is less well known but draws on argu-
ments surrounding the difficulties of drawing theological-political analogies from 
the nature of the Trinity, when the drawing of such metaphysical analogies had been 
a strategy of previous ‘monotheistic’ political theologians writing from the perspec-
tive of pagan forms of natural theology. He concludes his analysis with the follow-
ing summary, a summary which appears in addition to have Schmitt in its sights:
not only was monotheism as a political problem resolved and the Christian 
faith liberated from bondage to the Roman Empire, but a fundamental break 
was made with every ‘political theology’ that misuses the Christian proclama-
tion for the justification of the political situation. (Peterson 2011, p. 104)
9 Löwith (1949, p. 189) also testifies to these points: ‘As an eschatological message of the Kingdom 
of God the theology of the New Testament is essentially unconcerned with the political history of the 
world’ and ‘Such a theological understanding of the history of mankind cannot be translated into world-
historical terms and worked out into a philosophical system.’
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Of course, Peterson advances an assessment by a Christian theologian and historian 
of the validity of the idea of a political theology as a source of legitimacy and of 
ultimate existential allegiance. As Carl Schmitt’s reply to him in Political Theology 
II indicates, he is prepared to rule Peterson’s intervention as beside the point in so 
far as the problem of political theology is essentially juridical in nature. Ultimately 
this reply relies on an essentially circular basic position in which the very notion 
of the political is posited as an autonomous field due to the fact that it is identified 
entirely with the sovereign decision positing a distinction between friend and enemy. 
At the same time, Schmitt seeks to support this position on the autonomy and prior-
ity of the moment of the political by linking this moment of sovereign decision with 
the theme of political theology. In this way, the sovereign decision can be presented 
as an autonomous type of decision and act, but one with society-wide implications. 
As Blumenberg’s work plausibly indicates, however, questions of legitimacy are 
determined by an effective historical context which involves the sorts of metaphysi-
cal and theological questions and claims that Schmitt implausibly claims can only 
be resolved in the ‘moment’ of sovereign decision. In that case, in what ways does 
Peterson’s work shed light on these historically conditioned questions concerning 
legitimacy?
Peterson’s critique of Carl Schmitt suggests that the idea that the ‘truth’ of a polit-
ical theology is necessarily a decisive object of ultimate political allegiance and sov-
ereign decision is, at the very least, not required by the broader cultural and histori-
cal context determined by the reception of a Christian theology and metaphysics.10 
In itself, this argument undermines the necessary connection that Schmitt seeks to 
forge between the very notion of the political and political theology. Does this nega-
tive judgment on political theology place a contemporary hermeneutic of Peterson 
alongside Blumenberg in identifying political legitimacy with a straightforwardly 
pragmatic ideal of self-assertion mediated by a weak procedural liberal democratic 
frame? If so, we evidently return to the Schmittian rejoinder and, from there, to ago-
nic democracy as the logical outcome of the discussion.
Further consideration of the possibilities opened up by the historical context dis-
cussed by Peterson suggests instead that theological and metaphysical questions 
regarding the ultimate, ontological reliability of a self-asserted world-view of the 
sort that preoccupied Schmitt and even (implicitly) Blumenberg, as final terms of 
political debate, can in fact be supplanted by a more quotidian and crucially inter-
personal sphere in which such issues of reliability and trust specific to civic society, 
with its tragic admixture of imperfect organization, past injustice and coercion, are 
addressed. Trustworthiness in civic society, on this view, is not the product of an 
existential commitment to a type of political friendship sealed by adherence to a 
common world-view forged in relation to a polemical ‘state of emergency’. Rather, 
trustworthiness is worked out as an essentially interpersonal achievement through 
10 In contemporary political theory Radical Orthodoxy also highlights that the historical narrative of 
Christianity opens up a new ontology, politics and social formation founded on the priority of peace as a 
unique alternative to the essentially antagonistic politics of pagan antiquity, liberalism and nihilistic post-
modernism. See Milbank (2006).
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civic association and dialogue. However such an interpersonal achievement—polit-
ical solidarity—must be seen as logically prior to any institutionalized private or 
public right in mediating this distinctive form of civic association.
A ‘normal situation’ in Schmitt’s sense can only be settled and stabilized through 
a personal solidarity that sustains mutuality of trust in the concrete orders that 
develop in relation to specific historical challenges and the perennial imperatives 
and requirements of human nature. In so far as the element of trust, constitutive of 
the normative character of a certain way of arranging social and political institu-
tions, depends on the formation of an ethic of mutuality in passing through the trag-
edy of polemic, this implies a role for dialogue in the construction of such institu-
tions. In brief, Peterson’s work helps to locate an historical moment at which, in 
an especially clear sense, the conditions became available for uncovering, under the 
layers of a complex heritage of political theology, the essential interpersonal and 
dialogic dynamic of political community. Only this form of solidarity now provides 
the means for resolving the ‘states of emergency’ engendered by the tragic antago-
nisms of political life without default recourse to impersonal bureaucratic and mar-
ket-based sublimations of these conflicts. In this sense, Peterson was able to state 
that this historical moment disclosed the end of political theology as an ineluctable 
horizon of political activity.
Of course, the overall thrust of Schmitt’s interwar work was to challenge precisely 
this type of ‘associationalism’, which, in his view, risked compromising the stability 
of any given constitutional regime. After quoting Gierke’s characterization of such 
an ‘associationalist’ understanding of the normative basis for political regimes, to 
the effect that, ‘The will of the state or the sovereign is not the final source of law 
but is the organ of the people convoked to express legal consciousness as it emerges 
from the life of the people’ (Schmitt 2008, p. 24, quoting from Von Gierke 1974, p. 
31), Schmitt develops his critique of the ‘associationalist’ perspective in the follow-
ing terms. According to him, ‘The problem that arises is to what extent, with legal-
logical necessity, every ascertainment and decision contains a constitutive element, 
an intrinsic value of form’ (Schmitt 2008, p. 26). Although Schmitt’s sense, set out 
in this statement, that a personal grasp of the meaning of the ‘normal situation’ 
was essential to the operation of a legal order by its officials was sound, the further 
implication that this was ultimately always dependent on a ‘decision’ characterized 
in abstract terms and developed in and through a fundamental polemical stance was 
arguably insufficient in rooting the problem in a careful analysis of the historical 
context, revealed by Peterson, that had disclosed new, more authentic ways, in which 
the personal dynamics of political community could be developed and sustained. 
Indeed, the emphasis on the importance of personal understanding in the operation 
of the legal order is more plausibly supported by a dependence on a broader histori-
cally evolved social order than through a reliance on the decisionist and polemical 
energies of the Schmittian sovereign.
A final point to insist on is the need to avoid thinking of the notion of an ‘asso-
ciationalist’ constitutionalism as yet another secularized political theology. The idea 
of dialogue and mutuality can only provide a schematic idea of the solidarity required 
to sustain a ‘normal situation’ in which social and political institutions are delineated 
in ways that command trust and confidence and that can be extended and applied in 
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ways that consolidate the coherence of the forms of self-understanding and intelligi-
bility embodied in them. Crucially, the intelligibility of this normal situation depends 
on the mutuality and dialogue that is sustained in a particular historical context which 
requires a careful cultural analysis of the type developed by Blumenberg and Peterson. 
A mechanical application of some kind of social contract theory has the potential to 
seriously distort the concrete existential questions involved.
Conclusion
Carl Schmitt’s work has rightly prompted political theorists to engage in a deeper 
reflection on the nature of democracy and modern constitutionalism in the circum-
stances of globalization and in the context of an increasing dependence on transnational 
forms of what Habermas terms ‘systematic rationality’, represented by markets and 
bureaucracies, for social co-ordination. Concerns have arisen in this context regarding 
the sources of solidarity and regarding the risks of de-politicized models of governance 
that block contestation and fundamental social transformation. In addition, his work 
has also given inspired a more careful examination of the relationship between liberal 
ideals of the rule of law and problems of state security. Schmitt’s work certainly pro-
vides an indispensable focus for discussion in these areas. However, in reading Schmitt 
we need to be careful to problematize his basic concepts at a fundamental level in 
order to appropriate the insights contained in his work in a productive manner. This 
was done by examining the connections between Schmitt’s conception of the politi-
cal and related concepts like antagonism and political theology. We set the scene for 
the discussion by describing Hans Blumenberg’s challenge to the idea of legitimacy in 
modernity as a ‘secularization’ of an anterior political theology. We went on to explore 
how, although Blumenberg developed a powerful critique of Schmitt, his alternative 
ideal of self-assertion arguably did not sufficiently explore the inter-personal and ethi-
cal dimensions of constitutionalism. The final section set out an attempt at reconstruct-
ing a more definite ‘secular’ conception of contemporary constitutionalism in which, 
following Peterson’s thesis on the closure of political theology, existential ties of politi-
cal solidarity are understood as relative to circumstances and open to dialogue through 
a fundamental mutual recognition of human dignity. This enables a reconstruction of 
the idea of constitutionalism aimed not so much at antagonistic social transformation or 
at localizing forms of ultimate allegiance but at stabilizing forms of social and political 
continuity that can be understood as expressive of principles of mutuality and dialogue. 
Such a notion of constitutionalism first arose in a specific historical constellation but it 
remains effective and determining in a global or universal constitutional constellation 
where antagonistic forms of political theology, and bureaucratic and market rationality, 
can no longer provide a viable basis for stable political forms.
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